Oil in South-East Europe is not simply about consumption, demand curves, or refinery margins. It is about who controls access points, who commands refining capability, who manages pipelines and terminals, and who operates under which geopolitical influence. Unlike electricity, which is tied to internal generation and balancing, and unlike gas, which is dominated by dependency chains and storage leverage, oil in South-East Europe is fundamentally a game of infrastructure, refining power and global politics translated into regional realities. The region does not “set” the global price of oil—but it decisively shapes how global oil realities translate into local security, liquidity, stability and cost.
South-East Europe is strategically positioned between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, between the EU’s energy policy regime and Eurasian strategic energy ambitions, between legacy dependence on Russian supply and an accelerating diversification drive driven by sanctions, LNG substitutes and geopolitical recalibration. This makes SEE less important as a producer and far more important as a corridor and conversion hub. Whoever controls the nodes—refineries, terminals, pipelines, logistics arteries and retail distribution networks—controls the oil reality of the Balkans.
The Adriatic–Central European axis is the first decisive pillar of power, and Croatia is at its centre. The Rijeka refinery and, even more importantly, the JANAF pipeline system together form the most strategically critical oil infrastructure in South-East Europe. Crude coming through JANAF does not just serve Croatia; it feeds Hungary, Slovakia, Bosnia and indirectly stabilises supply options for a broader Central European region. In the post-sanctions environment, this has become even more valuable. Where once Russian pipeline crude dominated, JANAF today acts as a diversification backbone allowing the region to receive alternative supplies by sea. Croatia therefore holds structural leverage: it is physically smaller than its geopolitical oil importance. It is a gatekeeper.
Hungary represents the second anchor of oil power because of MOL. MOL is not a domestic oil company in the narrow sense; it is a regional energy sovereign, a corporate actor with the operational reach and strategic continuity of a geopolitical institution. MOL controls refining capacity in Hungary and Slovakia, has deep cross-border commercial penetration, commands retail networks, and influences fuel pricing and availability far beyond Hungarian territory. MOL’s investment strategy, feedstock diversification approach and refinery modernisation schedules directly shape oil product supply across large sections of Central Europe and the Balkans. In practice, MOL does not just react to market conditions—it creates regional conditions.
Serbia demonstrates how oil in SEE is never just economic. NIS, the dominant Serbian oil entity, is majority-owned by Gazprom Neft. That ownership structure injects Russian strategic energy presence directly into the Balkans through refining, wholesale distribution, and retail footprint. The Pančevo refinery is technologically upgraded and commercially competitive, but beyond its industrial value it serves as a geopolitical lever. Serbia’s oil policy is thus inherently foreign-policy constrained. The cost of fuel, supply resilience and the shape of Serbia’s national energy strategy cannot be separated from Russian strategic intent. Oil here is influence, not just energy.
Bosnia and Herzegovina occupies a different place in this architecture. Without major refining capability, heavily reliant on neighbouring countries and vulnerable to political fragmentation, Bosnia is not a power centre in oil. It is a pressure recipient. But because Bosnia’s economy and political stability depend on consistent fuel availability, the regional oil system indirectly holds political leverage through Bosnia’s dependency. Bosnia reminds the region that oil in SEE is not a purely commercial market; it is also a structural stability determinant.
Bulgaria is the point where refining power and geopolitical contest collide most visibly. Burgas–Lukoil Neftochim is one of the largest refineries in Europe and historically deeply embedded in Russian corporate and crude supply architecture. EU sanctions, transitional exemptions, domestic political struggles and policy battles have turned Bulgaria’s refinery into a strategic theatre. When it operates normally, Bulgaria not only meets its own demand but supports regional product supply. When uncertainty hits—ownership disputes, sanctions debates, or crude source disruptions—the ripple spreads across SEE. Bulgaria does not just refine fuel; it refines geopolitical tension into market consequence.
Romania introduces a different flavour: capability and resilience. With domestic oil production, refining infrastructure, Black Sea access and a strong industrial base, Romania stands as a stabilising pole in SEE oil. Companies like OMV Petrom anchor both national confidence and regional reliability. Romania is not immune to global price swings, but its internal structure reduces panic vulnerability. It can absorb shocks better than others and can supply or balance neighbours under stress conditions. Romania matters because it demonstrates that regional oil power can also come from strength rather than leverage.
Across these countries runs a single unifying reality: oil power in South-East Europe belongs to infrastructure operators, refiners and global traders before it belongs to governments or retailers. Infrastructure owners—JANAF pipeline management, major port terminals, Black Sea logistics operators—shape what is physically possible. Refining giants like MOL, NIS/Gazprom Neft influences, OMV Petrom and Bulgaria’s refinery ecosystem turn physical possibility into product availability. Global commodity trading houses—Vitol, Trafigura, Glencore, Shell, TotalEnergies—bridge SEE with global oil markets, deciding when the region is an attractive destination or when barrels go elsewhere.
Retail networks matter too, but in a different way. Fuel station operators like MOL’s retail arm, OMV’s networks, NIS Petrol chains and national distribution systems determine how quickly international price movements hit consumers and how politically explosive price surges become. Their market power is social and political rather than structural. They shape perceived energy reality, not global oil fundamentals.
Overlaying everything is policy and sanctions architecture. Brussels shapes SEE oil every bit as much as infrastructure managers or refinery owners. Every change in sanctions timelines, every adjustment in allowed crude sources, every regulatory tightening on ownership and compliance reshapes commercial strategy overnight. Oil in SEE is therefore as much controlled in EU institutions and major geopolitical capitals as it is in local ministries.
Price discovery, unlike in electricity or gas, is largely global. Brent benchmarks, refined product pricing in the Mediterranean and Black Sea markets, freight rates and global financial trading dominate baseline pricing. South-East Europe does not invent price—it translates it. But SEE shapes spreads, risk premiums and supply stability perception. It determines whether bringing oil here is profitable or politically complicated. That in turn influences which cargoes come and at what price conditions.
Cross-border flows therefore depend on three simultaneous forces. Infrastructure decides where oil can physically move. Corporate strategy determines how that infrastructure is used. Geopolitics decides whether that movement is allowed, encouraged, constrained or punished. Croatia and JANAF pull alternatives into the heart of Europe. Hungary and MOL distribute and monetise. Bulgaria anchors supply with a refinery that doubles as a political battlefield. Romania stabilises. Serbia embeds Russian influence. Bosnia reveals systemic vulnerability.
So when we talk about who controls oil liquidity, cross-border flows and price reality in South-East Europe, the answer is not symbolic. Power resides in a triangle of dominance:
– Refining giants and their corporate owners
– Pipeline and port infrastructure controllers
– Global oil traders combined with EU-sanctions and geopolitical policy power
Beyond barrels, this is where true control lies. Oil in SEE is the intersection of geography, engineering and geopolitics. It is not decided in petrol stations or news headlines. It is decided by who can turn physical infrastructure into strategic leverage—and in South-East Europe, that group is small, deeply entrenched and far more influential than the barrels themselves.